AT THE BEGINNING OF THE sixth century of the Christian era, the empire of Constantinople was beset with enemies and sinking to decay. The tide of barbarian invasion had lately overwhelmed one half of the ancient provinces of Rome, and these conquests, both by their effect and their example, threatened speedy downfall to the rest. The emperors became either hated from their reforms, or despised from their incapacity, and in either case their fate was the same. Frequent insurrections wasted the resources of the state, and deprived the government of all energy and enterprise; while the armies, turbulent and feeble, had thrown off the restraints of military discipline. It is the purpose of my narrative, to show how the genius of one man averted these dangers, and corrected these defects; how the tottering empire was upheld; how the successors of Augustus were enabled, for a time, to resume their former ascendancy, and to wrest from the hands of the barbarians their most important possessions.
Belisarius, as Procopius briefly tells us, was born at Germania, on the confines of Thrace and Illyria. The name of his birth-place has awakened the patriotic ardor of two learned Germans, who labor with more zeal than success to extort Pannonia from the words of the historian, and to claim the hero as their countryman. Germania is elsewhere mentioned as a city of some importance, and as being in the neighborhood of Sardica, but its precise position is unknown. It does not seem improbable that its name, may have been derived from the ancient settlement of some German families, and that the forefathers of Belisarius may have been connected in kindred with these strangers.
The exact age of Belisarius is not recorded; but in his first military enterprise, which took place about two years before the accession of Justinian, we find him termed by Procopius, a lately bearded stripling. The same expression is applied by the same historian to Photius at his departure for the Gothic war. Now the mother of Photius was then thirty-six years of age, and her son could, therefore, hardly have exceeded twenty. If we suppose this to have been the age of Belisarius at his earliest exploit, and fix his birth twenty years before, [A.D. 505.] we shall, I think, approach as nearly to the truth as our imperfect information will allow.
Some modern historians deny Belisarius the advantage of liberal studies, and place his birth amongst the peasants of his province. Yet from two passages in Procopius, which have not hitherto been observed, it may be concluded that he was of noble blood, and inherited a patrimonial fortune. He is mentioned as possessing an estate near Constantinople, in the year before the African expedition, when, having but very lately been appointed to any high or lucrative station, he could hardly have derived from it the means of purchase. Nor could he have acquired this property by marriage, since his wife’s first husband had died poor. Besides, the Greek word used by Procopius is almost always applied exclusively to that property which descends by hereditary right. As to the family of Belisarius, we may remark the letter addressed by Pharas, the Herulian prince, to king Gelimer at Papua. “why should you”, writes the former, “consider it disgraceful to be a subject of Justinian with Belisarius and myself? Though we also, like you, are of noble birth, we glory in obeying so magnanimous a sovereign”. Were not these words entirely conclusive, it might be added that Procopius, in his later libel, says nothing of the parents of Belisarius, though he gladly commemorates those of his wife, as common charioteers, those of the emperor as peasants, and those of the empress as comedians. His animosity would certainly not have forgotten or suppressed a circumstance which his prejudices would consider ignominious to the hero.
That Belisarius held the Christian faith is apparent from his spiritual adoption of Theodosius, and from the religious zeal of the emperor, who strictly excluded all pagans and heretics from office.
The first step of Belisarius in his military career was an appointment in the personal guards of Justinian, while yet heir apparent to the throne. Since, at this period, these places were usually bestowed as the rewards of long service, or of some eminent achievement, we may regard the choice of Belisarius as a proof of his early promise. At Constantinople no opportunities could arise for military fame, and history is silent on his actions, until we find him promoted to the command of a squadron in the Persian war. But before we follow Belisarius to the banks of the Euphrates, it will be proper to examine the composition of the Byzantine armies, and the frontiers, administration, and resources of, the Byzantine empire at this time. Such information, though most essential, is not easily obtained; it is passed over by the contemporary writers as generally known, and can only be gathered from their short and scattered allusions.
After the conquest of Italy by the barbarians and the disuse of its language, it might have been expected that the subjects of Constantinople would no longer call themselves Romans. But this title was too glorious to be so readily relinquished. In every succeeding age the rabble of Greek armies still boasted of their kindred with the ancient legions; and the name of Romania was applied to the varying limits of the Byzantine territory, until it has settled on Thrace, to which they were latterly confined. At the accession of Justinian, however, the boundaries of his empire were nearly the same as those of the Ottoman at present (AD 1838). Its northern frontier in Europe was marked by the Danube; and some castles beyond that river were maintained rather to secure the passage than with any view of ulterior possessions. From the Save the line of frontier turned inwards to the south, meeting the Adriatic below Epidaurus, and bounding the Gothic province of Dalmatia. The whole territory between Thermopylae and the Danube was termed, in its eastern portion, Thrace, in its western, Illyria, or, more properly, Illyricum; and the two Moesias, which are seldom mentioned in this age, appear to have become mere subordinate divisions of these provinces. Thus, therefore, both Thrace and Illyria must always be understood at this period as extending to the Danube. The northern districts had suffered most severely from barbarian inroads during the preceding century, and their desolation was witnessed by Priscus, when proceeding on his embassy to Attila. “We found”, he says, “the city of Naissus nearly subverted by the enemy, and forsaken by all its inhabitants, except a few sick wretches, who had crept beneath the ruins of the churches for shelter. As we travelled onwards, we saw the banks of the river thickly strewed with the bones of the slain”. Some relief and repose was, however, afforded to these unhappy provinces when the emperors yielded their claims on Noricum and Pannonia to Theodoric the Great. The Ostrogoths thenceforward served as a shield and bulwark to the Thracian and Illyrian lines. But the victories of the Romans in Italy under Belisarius proved fatal to their security on this frontier. The Goths withdrew their troops for domestic defence, new hoards of barbarians rushed in to occupy their place, and the Romans found it necessary to fortify the passage of the Danube with numerous entrenchments, and to guard it with unremitting care. The key of their position was Singidunum, or Belgrade, advantageously situated at the confluence of the Danube and the Save; it had been laid in ashes by the Huns, but was rebuilt and strengthened by Justinian. From thence to the Euxine, the southern bank was bristled with upwards of sixty fortresses, each was provided with an adequate garrison, and an officer appointed to the general inspection and control of all. Such precautions, added to the want of boats, kept the barbarians in check during summer, but the severity of the winters often enabled them to effect their passage on the ice. Having once crossed the great river, they without further hindrance swept over the open country, outstripped th e march, or repulsed the attacks of the forces sent against them, and returned homewards, laden with their spoil. It is true that above five hundred forts are pompously set forth as having been constructed or repaired by Justinian; but their very number is the most convincing proof of their weakness, and in most cases they probably consisted of only a single tower. By their means the approach of the enemy might be discerned from afar, and the peasants, crowding within them, might securely await the passage of barbarians, impatient of delay and ignorant of sieges. The inefficiency of these forts in withholding the progress of invaders is also manifested by the need of other special bulwarks for the Grecian provinces and Byzantine capital. The defile of Thermopylae was carefully fortified; and, in case its entrenchments should be broken through, another line across the isthmus of Corinth defended the Peloponnesus. But the protection of Constantinople was fat more costly and laborious, because far less assisted by nature. Besides its immediate ramparts, the emperor Anastasius built, and Justinian Strengthened, the celebrated makron teichos, or Long Wall, extending from the Propontis to the Euxine. Its distance from the capital was forty miles, its length threescore; it was flanked with numerous towers, and guarded by a constant garrison. Such plans for national fortifications have been often tried, yet in no country from Scotland to China, have they ever proved effectual; they are found either too limited for restraint, or too extensive for defence.
From the Bosphorus, the Roman empire stretched for several hundred miles along the coast of Asia, till the town of Rhizaeum, below Trebizond. Here the line of frontier turned round the wild mountains of the Zani, and proceeded southwards, comprehending the cities of Theodosiopolis and Dara, and following the course of the Nymphaeus till its junction with the Tigris, and of the Aborrhas, till it met the Euphrates at Circesium. Beyond the latter river, the Persian and Byzantine territories were separated by a wide and inhospitable desert, inhabited only by some roving tribes of Arabs, who declared themselves the allies of either party, whenever they found a favorable opportunity for plundering the other. The Roman provinces of Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, often felt, and always feared their rapine; and even the fear of it proved fatal to industry and cultivation, The rugged and almost inaccessible chain of mountains in the south of Asia Minor bore at this time the name of Isauria, which had formerly been applied to only one of its districts. Its inhabitants displayed the common character of mountaineers : impatience of control and recklessness of danger; and became by turns the most destructive enemies and most valiant soldiers of the empire. Their flying parties laid waste the open country from Ephesus to Antioch, and made even the inmate of cities tremble within his walls. Often defeated, but never subdued, they enriched themselves either by these predatory visits, or by a yearly tribute of five thousand pounds weight of old as the price of their tranquillity; and this system had continued for a great number of years [A.D. 474—491] when their countryman Zeno ascended the imperial throne. The great favor and indulgence shown them in this reign naturally produced their disaffection in the next, and they rose against Anastasius in a general rebellion, which could not be disregarded or forgiven, like their former hasty inroads. he long and bloody war which ensued brought about their thorough subjection; and under Justinian they formed the flower of the Roman armies. But Asia Minor had suffered from their havoc as severely as the east from the Saracens, or Thrace and Illyria from the barbarians of the Danube; and when to these we add the frequent expeditions of the Vandals in the Aegean Sea, it will be perceived that scarcely any Roman district had of late been free from desolation, and that the real strength of the empire at the accession of Justinian by no means corresponded to the number and extent of its provinces.
It is remarkable, that as the territory of the Romans in this age nearly approached to that of the Turks at present, so the troops appointed for its defence, under each, were precisely the same. The number of one hundred and fifty thousand men was fixed both by Justinian and by Solyman; but in the latter case, this force was real and effective, and in the former, little more than an empty sound, which served to please the vanity, or allay the apprehensions of the people. Not one half the number were certainly ever enlisted; they were barely sufficient to garrison the frontiers; and an army of fifteen or twenty thousand men for active operations, could not be mustered without great difficulty and delay. In the annals of this age, we are often astonished at the smallness of the means with which the most mighty wars are undertaken and waged, whilst, in the foregoing century, the Byzantine empire could send forth an expedition of one hundred thousand men. The chief root of this evil was the negligence and weakness of Justinian, who often allowed the officers to supply the rations of the army, and the paymasters to levy the taxes for its maintenance. Thus, it manifestly became the interest of both these classes, to keep the number of the soldier far below their returns to the government, and to permit frequent furloughs from the most important posts, and on the most trifling occasions. Justinian endeavored to restrain these abuses by an edict, but they were inherent to the very nature of his military system.
The Roman troops at this period no longer bore the slightest resemblance to those of Scipio or of Caesar. The very name of legions was disused. From the foolish vanity of commanding a greater number of these squadrons, successive emperors had diminished them in size, until from six or seven thousand men they dwindled to as many hundreds. Thus, in the fourth century, we find the defence of a single, city committed to seven legions. In the fifth, that name is applied to a body of twelve hundred, and to another of only eight hundred men, and in the time of Belisarius it had altogether disappeared. It was not uncommon at this period to divide the troops according to their birth-place or nation; and thus, for example, the Isaurians, instead of being draughted into the other squadrons of the empire, marched beneath a separate standard. This policy, the first germ of the feudal system in the middle ages, destroyed all unity of feeling among the troops as brother Romans, and all unity of discipline as fellow soldiers, and rendered them more like an assemblage of allies than the army of a single power. The flower of the forces consisted of the doryphori or guards, who were attached, not merely to the person of the emperor, but to that of every general or officer of distinction, and who, in either case, were highly honored and carefully selected. This post was conferred on those most distinguished for strength and stature, even from amongst the captives made in war, and was often assigned to veterans as the reward of some eminent exploit. A larger pay was bestowed on them than on the other soldiers; their arms were more complete; and their chargers (they were always horsemen) were equally fitted for close combat or long journeys. The best officers of this century were trained amongst these troops. Besides their general oath of fidelity to the state, they bound themselves by a particular obligation to their chief or patron, and were termed his household, a phrase analogous to that of maison militaire in modern France. Those of the emperor bore the name of the schools, and amounted only to three thousand five hundred soldiers, till Justinian added two thousand to their number. Yet they were never so weak as in his reign. Under former governments, when each guardsman was chosen for merit, they formed a band of iron veterans, a last resource against barbarian invaders, and their disciplined valor might have triumphed over tenfold antagonists. It was the emperor Zeno who first broke through the ancient order, by granting this promotion to many of his Isaurian countrymen, more remarkable for attachment to his person than for their service to the state. But in the latter years of Justinian the tide of corruption overflowed all bounds. Commissions in the schools were exposed to public sale, the highest bidder was esteemed the bravest soldier, and these posts were eagerly purchased by unwarlike citizens, desirous of exemption from civil duties without incurring military dangers. Thus the hardy veterans, the Armenian and Isaurian mountaineers, were replaced by lazy townsmen unable to wield their own weapons; and thus it will be seen in the sequel, that when the barbarians had forced the Long Wall and were advancing to the capital, these troops could make no efforts for its rescue, and scarcely surpassed in courage or exertion the terrified crowd of women and of children.
In the days of the ancient republic the chief strength of the legion consisted of its foot soldiers, and in comparison with them the cavalry was neglected and despised. In fact, it is to the deficiency of the Romans in this branch of military service that Polybius ascribes their frequent reverses in the second Punic war. The barbarians of the north on the contrary, considered horsemen the most honorable; and the imperial mercenaries soon spread amongst the Romans a prejudice so agreeable to the decline of military vigor. Accordingly, in the reign of Justinian, all the best troops were mounted, and the infantry had dwindled to a small and subordinate band. It is true, that on one occasion (the African expedition) we find them exceed the cavalry in numbers, but this may probably be ascribed to the cost and difficulty of transporting horses on so long a voyage. In most cases the foot soldiers were not merely inferior in number at the outset of each campaign, but, as Procopius tells us, they often diminished during its progress, because the capture of horses from the enemy enabled them to join the more popular and easy service. Their officers seldom condescended to share their fatigues, but looked upon their rank as a privilege to ride, and it will readily be imagined how hurtful an effect this example produced among the subalterns. Like most men, when unjustly contemned, they soon sunk to the level of their reputation; and it was only by the care of Belisarius, that they in some degree retrieved it. The same principle of indolence and relaxation, which transformed the Byzantine troops to horsemen, also induced them to lay aside the weighty weapons of their forefathers. Their chief reliance in this age was placed upon the bow; and as archers they were less expert than the Persians, but more so than the Goths. For close combat every soldier was provided with a sword, and this was the only weapon which the guards retained when stationed in a peaceful city. In the field the guards appear to have been distinguished by the special use of the lance. Each horseman bore a shield, and his person was still further protected by greaves, a cuirass, and a helmet.
The declining strength and spirit of the Roman soldiers had introduced the use of barbarian mercenaries at a very early period; and it was observed, even in the reign of Tiberius, that the vigor of the armies was drawn from foreigners alone. But this dangerous resource was at first confined to narrow bounds, most of these levies being compelled to adopt the discipline and follow the ranks of the legions; and the subsequent error, of permitting them to form in separate squadrons, and to outnumber the native troops, was glaring and fatal. Under Justinian it was thought prudent to distrust, but necessary to employ, them. These auxiliaries were obtained either by a public treaty with the nation to which they belonged, or by the allurements held out to private ambition. In the former case they served only for a particular period, in the latter they were considered as permanent troops of the empire, and in either they bore the name of federates. Amongst the foremost of these, were the Massagetes or Huns, dwelling to the northward of the Caucasus: they were remarkable for their skill in horsemanship and archery. The Heruli were likewise mounted, and, being almost unencumbered with defensive armor, were extremely useful as light cavalry; but they are represented by Procopius as the most drunken and deceitful of all the barbarian tribes. A part of the country beyond the Danube was their native seat, they had often desolated the Roman provinces with their incursions, and had rendered tributary to them even the aspiring nation of the Lombards; but, at the accession of Justinian, their preeminence had greatly declined. Any of these barbarians, when joining a Byzantine army, marched under their own national banner, were commanded by their own officers, and commonly adhered to the military regulations of their countrymen. It was only with great difficulty, and through some severe examples, that Belisarius succeeded in rendering them in some degree amenable to the laws of Roman discipline. The inefficiency of such mingled and discordant forces, and the difficulty of uniting them to one common end, have been felt in every age; and nothing tends more strongly to enhance the conquests of Belisarius, than to view a structure so expensive raised from such slender materials.
In the reign of Constantine the Great, the Roman troops had been ranked in two classes: the limitanei, who guarded the frontiers; and the comitatenses, who attended the sovereign and undertook any military enterprise. But this distinction appears soon to have become nominal and empty; and though some faint trace of it may still be found in the edicts of Justinian, none appear in the records of his wars. The system of pay at this latter period was founded on judicious policy, and might perhaps be advantageously applied in modern times. A small stipend was allowed to the newly levied soldier, but it gradually increased according to his term of service; and the veteran was enabled, not merely to live in opulence, but to bequeath some money to his heirs. A gift to each soldier, of five pieces of gold, was also usually made once in as many years; but Justinian altogether suppressed this indulgence, at the very period when the victories of the Roman army seemed most to deserve his liberality. The troops might have borne the loss of their donative; but the avarice and negligence of the emperor, in withholding their regular pay, loosened the only tie by which military obedience can be secured, or even claimed. Such arrears, which we find constantly recurring in the annals of this reign, counteracted the efforts of Belisarius for the restoration or maintenance of discipline, while the disaffection of the soldiers was displayed, sometimes in loud complaints, and sometimes in secret conspiracies Large bodies of deserters enlisted in the Persian and Gothic ranks, from no other ground; and the remainder were reduced to a state of poverty which compelled them to plunder the provincials, and which thereby impaired both their good order and their popularity.
Such was the state of the Byzantine empire at the accession of Justin the First. (AD 518). By birth an Illyrian peasant, by profession a soldier, Justin had distinguished himself in the Isaurian war, and had gradually attained the post of commander to the imperial guards. Already in the dotage of his faculties, he had long survived the military daring to which he owed his reputation and his rise. His education had, of course, been neglected, and his ignorance was such, that his signature could only be obtained by means of a wooden case, which directed his pen through the four first letters of his name. Unpractised in business, yet jealous of authority, he was equally unable to reign or to resign. From the very first, the chief administration of affairs devolved on Justinian, his nephew and intended heir, whom he was reluctantly compelled to raise up from office to office, and at length to acknowledge as his partner on the throne. His death, after a languid reign of nine years, and a life of nearly fourscore, left Justinian sole sovereign, in name as well as in fact.
In comparing the new emperor with his illustrious contemporaries at Ravenna and at Ctesiphon, it may he remarked that their very unequal merit has been almost equally rewarded by fame. The memory of Justinian is adored by the civil lawyers, Theodoric jet lives in the rustic songs and legends of his countrymen, and the Eastern historians celebrate Nushirvan as the greatest and most glorious of their sovereigns. By their absolute power, all three possessed the means, by the length of their reigns the leisure, for effecting any plans of conquest or reform. Yet it will be found, that while the kings of Persia and of Italy were indebted to their own achievements for renown, the Roman emperor only shines as a general or legislator through the borrowed light of Belisarius and Tribonian. His mind was essentially feeble, and bore the appearance of fickleness and inconsistency, because it could form no opinions of its own, and was compelled to lean on others for direction and support. To him the last adviser always seemed the wisest, and the absent always in the wrong. From hence proceeded his fears and suspicions with regard to Belisarius, often checked by the aspect of the hero, but constantly reviving in his absence, and which no length of service, no trial of fidelity, were sufficient to destroy. The religion of Justinian was sincere and fervent, but, as commonly happens to a weak understanding, was less fruitful of virtues than of rites and forms. While he carried his fasts and vigils to the utmost extent of monkish self-denial, he directed the assassination of Vitalian, to whom he had lately sworn upon the Eucharist the friendship of a brother. His persecutions of all heretics, all Jews, and even of the small remnant of Pagans, and the desolation of Palestine, by goading the Samaritans into revolt, may be partly excused by the intolerant spirit of the age, but certainly outstripped it in fierceness, and appear ridiculous as well as hateful, since this scourge of heretics became, in his dotage, a heretic himself.
The defect of his judgment in business may be compared to the false coloring of an unskillful painter, by which all the parts of a landscape seem equally removed. In aiming at different objects, he did not consider their relative importance, but pursued the slightest with the same zeal and energy as the most momentous. The building of a church at Constantinople, or the restoration of the Catholic faith in Africa, the acquisition of a kingdom, or the repairs of a fortress, all occupied precisely the same space in his little mind. Ambitious of uniting the fame of an architect with that of a conqueror, he lavished in splendid fabrics at home the sums by which his foreign armies should have been recruited and maintained. While these favorite edifices wrung from an exhausted people its resources for defence, the distant armies were too often deprived of pay, pinched with want, or from the delay of reinforcements overwhelmed by the superior numbers of the enemy.
No sooner had the Emperor sent an expedition from Constantinople, than he seemed to have dismissed it likewise from his thoughts. His predecessor, Anastasius, though diminishing the public burthens, had amassed and bequeathed a sum of no less than three hundred and twenty thousand pounds weight of gold; and the accumulated treasures of the Goths and Vandals were poured before the throne of Justinian. But all these resources were insufficient to supply his prodigality; heavy taxes were imposed, old arrears were claimed, offices put to sale, charities suppressed, private fortunes seized; in short, every act of rapacity, injustice, and oppression, was practiced by his ministers, and meanness was called in to support magnificence.
It may be observed, that greater evils commonly result to a state from the weakness than from the vices of its sovereign, since his incapacity rears and fosters a thousand subordinate oppressors whom a more active tyranny restrains. The subjects of Justinian, finding themselves injured and impoverished in his reign, viewed him with detestation as the cause of their calamities. Yet their angry invectives should not blind us to his real merits. His private life deserves the praise of temperance, study, and devotion; he appeared easy of access, and courteous in demeanor; and his temper was naturally gentle and forgiving. If he was prone to suspect, he was, however, slow in punishing. His earnest desire of fame, though often degenerating into petty vanity, was yet the spring of many noble undertakings; nor can posterity forget how greatly he promoted, and encouraged the compilation of the Roman jurisprudence. His discernment of military merit has been justly praised; and he might have secured both the attachment and the welfare of his subjects, had his choice of ministers been equally happy. His principal favorites were Tribonian and John of Cappadocia. The former was a man of commanding talents and deep learning, but he is accused by his contemporaries of the utmost corruption in administering the laws. The latter, dissolute and cruel, a scoffer at religion, rapacious for the profit of the Emperor and for his own, crushed the people by the weight of his exactions, and was at length dismissed, not for his notorious plunder, but for an alleged conspiracy. The charges against him may perhaps have been exaggerated, from the usual readiness of mankind to trample on the fallen; yet they are countenanced by the strong and universal hatred displayed against him in the sedition of Nika. But it was the Empress Theodora who ruled with the most absolute power over the mind of her husband, and therefore over the administration of the state. Her youth had been spent on the public stage, and in the most unrestrained pursuit of pleasure; and the first act of Justinian, on ascending the throne, was to contract a marriage which would have disgraced the meanest of his subjects. Dismissing her lovers, the fair comedian was allowed to regulate the faith and to wield the destinies of provinces. Her anger was capricious, her resentment deep and bloody, and her avarice boundless. The character of Theodora formed a singular contrast to that of Justinian; an d it will be seen, in the sequel, how severely Belisarius suffered from the stern passions of the one and yielding weakness of the other.
DURING NEARLY THE WHOLE REIGN of Anastasius, at Constantinople, the throne of Persia was held by Kobad, seventeenth of the Sassanides. The warfare which the Emperor waged against him had been most disastrous to the Romans. Amida had been shamefully lost, in spite of the heroic efforts of its citizens, and still more shamefully recovered, by a ransom to the victors. An army of fifty-two thousand men, the greatest ever sent forth in this century by the Byzantine government, had been entrusted to the command of some worthless favorites: they were overthrown in several pitched engagements, and still more frequently fled without hazarding a blow. Thus the name of the, Romans, in this quarter, became degraded and despised; their spirit was broken; and they might perhaps have been driven from Asia, had not Kobad, at that juncture, been suddenly called elsewhere by the invasion of some Northern hordes. Embarrassed by these new and formidable enemies, he agreed to a truce with the Romans; which, though concluded at first for only seven years, had been prolonged till the reign of Justin. Some causes of complaint, on both sides, bad, however, since arisen. An ancient treaty enacted, that neither should build additional fortresses near the common frontier; yet, by order of Anastasius, the open town of Dara was surrounded with lofty ramparts, and became the strongest bulwark of the Romans in the East. On the other hand, the gates or defiles of Caucasus, which commanded the passage of these mountains, and restrained the barbarians beyond them, were usurped by the Persians. Yet these mutual injuries served, in some degree, to balance each other, and might have failed in producing a renewal of the war, had they not been envenomed by a separate and more recent injury.
Kobad shared the fate of most monarchs: he hated his natural heir, and was attached to his youngest sons, perhaps only as viewing in them the future enemies of the elder. He had formed the plan of breaking through the customary order, and of naming for his successor his third son, afterwards celebrated under the name of Chosroes by the Greeks, and of Khosrou or Nushirvan by the Persians. As a first step to this exaltation, the King deemed it desirable that Chosroes should be adopted by the Roman Emperor, and, by this high though fictitious kindred, become more distinguished in the public estimation. This proposal, which included an offer of friendship and alliance, was joyfully received by Justin and his nephew; and they were about to close with it, when Proclus, one of their most trusted ministers, withheld them. He set forth to them, that, by adoption, Chosroes would acquire the rights of a son to Justin, and might therefore urge his claim to the empire, in preference to Justinian. This groundless fear (for what Byzantine subject would have acknowledged the claim of a Magian?) prevailed over the considerations of sound policy. Unwilling to grant, and yet afraid to deny, the two Princes endeavored to elude the difficulty by refusing a civil but offering a military adoption. The last, it seems, was reserved for barbarians, and considered less honorable than the former. But this answer was heard with indignation by the Persian ambassador; the conferences were broken off in mutual displeasure; and Nushirvan, who, in full confidence of a speedy invitation, had already advanced to the banks of the Tigris, returned homewards, brooding over future projects of revenge.
It was on these grounds, and in the latter part of Justin’s reign, that Kobad renewed the war; and his first enterprise was the invasion of Iberia. This country was governed by its native princes, but had long been tributary to the Persians. Its inhabitants, zealous Christians since the time of Constantine, had yet never swerved from their allegiance to a Magian, until the persecuting zeal of Kobad, precisely at this time, changed religious into political adversaries. They disclaimed his authority, and besought the protection of the Emperor, who promised them large reinforcements, but sent only a handful of soldiers. Meanwhile Kobad, disabled by old age from leading his troops in person, dispatched a powerful army against the Iberians, headed by a varisa or Governor of a Persian province. All resistance was overborne by his superior numbers; the whole country was subdued; and Gurgenes, its prince, found it necessary to withdraw, as a helpless exile, to Constantinople. During this more important warfare, some petty hostilities took place on the Armenian frontier, which are only memorable as first raising to historical notice the great captain of that age. Belisarius, who had now attained the command of a squadron, performed his earliest recorded achievement, jointly with another Roman officer, named Sittas, by an inroad into Persarmenia. They ravaged a large extent of country, and brought back a considerable number of prisoners. On a second incursion, however, they were less fortunate, being suddenly attacked and overthrown by some Persians under Narses. Yet we may conclude that the personal conduct of Belisarius, on the last occasion, was not only free from blame, but even entitled to praise, since we find him, immediately afterwards, promoted to the post of Governor of Dara, and commander of the forces stationed in that city. The fates of his first antagonist and colleague may also excite some interest. Narses soon afterwards deserted to the Romans, with his two brothers, and served against the Goths in Italy, but must not be confounded with the celebrated eunuch of that name. Sittas advanced his fortune by a marriage with a sister of the Empress Theodora, and was appointed to a command in Armenia, where he fell in battle.
It was at Dara that Belisarius chose for his secretary Procopius, afterwards the historian of his times. This writer, born at Caesarea, in Palestine, was a lawyer in the early part of his career, and a senator, or perhaps a prefect at its close. With regard to his religion, there is strong reason to believe that he held the Christian faith. He attended Belisarius throughout his campaigns till his las t return from Italy, and declares himself to have been an eyewitness of almost every transaction he relates. His narrative happily combines the judgment of a statesman, with the spirit of a soldier, but its chronology is broken, and its interest impaired by the division of his books, (two Persian, two Vandal, and four Gothic), according to the countries and wars. As these writings afforded but few opportunities to introduce the name of the unwarlike Emperor with praise, six books of Edifices were added by Procopius, wherein he pours forth all the flatteries which thirst for promotion can inspire. On considering the value of his testimony as an historian, the only apparent drawback is presumed partiality to his master. But, against this feeling, there are in his case two distinct securities. His work was written at a period when Belisarius had been recalled from active employment, and had suffered beneath the Imperial suspicion and displeasure, and it was written for presentation, not to the victorious General, but to the jealous Monarch. Secondly, it is evident from the book of Anecdotes, or Secret History, which Procopius afterwards compiled, that he was, in fact, a private enemy and accuser of Belisarius, having probably been disappointed in the payment for his services. It was, therefore, neither his interest nor his inclination to set forth the achievements of Belisarius in too favorable colors, or to give them higher praise than their recent and well-known merit imperiously demanded.
Several modern critics have doubted whether Procopius be really the writer of the Secret History, and have endeavored to decry its testimony altogether, but their judgment appears to be misled by their too partial admiration of Belisarius or Justinian. Their arguments only tend to show what might have been presumed, that this libel was not openly acknowledged or generally circulated. The degree of credit which it deserves is, however, allowed on all hands to be small. What reliance can be placed upon an author, who seriously believed Justinian an incarnate daemon; and asserts of the conqueror of Africa and Italy that he was universally despised as a traitor, and scoffed at as, a fool? Such unmeasured accusations only recoil on the accuser; and Procopius little thought, whilst la boring to blacken the memory of others, how deep a stain he was imprinting on his own. But the want of authentic memoirs forbids us to cast away the lampoon, and in weighing and selecting its assertions, we should, I think, be mainly guided by their publicity. We may trust those specific charges, which must, if true, have been generally known, and which therefore, if false, could hardly have been brought forward by a contemporary. According to this test many very serious accusations against Belisarius may be looked upon as sufficiently established. When, on the other hand, the Secret History relates, for example, a private conversation between Antonina and the Empress, which each had a strong interest in concealing, or an equally secret, and still more improbable scene, in a subterranean chamber at Carthage, I have no hesitation in rejecting its authority.
Soon after Belisarius had assumed the command at Dara, the death of Justin left his nephew in full possession of the throne. The new Emperor perceived the importance of strengthening and securing the fortifications which Anastasius had constructed at Dara. The impregnable city of Nisibis, once the bulwark of the Romans in the East, and which had stood three sieges against Sapor, had been surrendered to Persia by the treaty of Jovian. Being only fifteen miles from that fortress, Dara served, in some measure, to supply its place and diminish its importance, and, above all, it promised great advantages in case of an invasion, by delaying the progress of the hostile army. Fully impressed with these considerations, Justinian directed Belisarius to build a castle on the frontier, within three miles of Dara, as a defence and bulwark to its ramparts. Belisarius showed great activity in fulfilling these orders; he selected a convenient site at Mindon, and by the multitude of workmen the walls had already risen to some height above the ground, when he received a haughty mandate from the Persians, requiring him to stop short in this undertaking, and in case of refusal threatening an attack. It appears that there then existed some agreement between both parties on this frontier to refrain from those petty, yet ruinous incursions, which add nothing either to the advancement or the glory of the war, and are only productive of mutual devastation. The Persians, however, were determined that this interval of quiet should not be employed in preparing fresh obstacles for them to overcome. Their demand was referred to Justinian by the Roman general, and the Emperor, far from allowing the building to be discontinued, sent reinforcements to Belisarius, and desired him to withstand all aggression to the utmost. The Byzantine army stationed itself for the defence, the Persian advanced for the destruction, of the Castle, and a long and well contested engagement ensued. It was at last decided against the Romans, many of their bravest soldiers were slain or taken prisoners, and the remainder were driven back within the walls of Dara.
The victorious Persians proceeded without further hindrance to raze the unfinished and forsaken fortress to the ground, and then returned in triumph to Nisibis, their former station. The conduct of Belisarius in the skirmish of Mindon is not mentioned, but we find the same collateral evidence as in his Persarmenian expedition, to prove that it was not unworthy of his fame. Within a few months from this time, he was named Commander in Chief on the whole line of Asiatic frontier, with the high title of general of the East, and these honors never could so closely have followed his defeat had it been in the slightest degree attributable to his want of skill, of courage, or of personal exertion. From this period, [A.D. 530] the actions of his life assume a national and historical importance, instead of claiming interest only as the first steps of a celebrated man. We have endeavored to explore the fountain, we may now embark in the stream, and follow the current of the river.
In his new appointment, Belisarius continued to fix his head-quarters at Dara, and earnestly applied himself to raise and collect an army. For this purpose, he appears to have traversed the neighboring provinces in person, and at last succeeded in mustering five and twenty thousand men, but the discipline of these forces was relaxed, and their spirit broken by their former reverses. On returning to Dara, the general was joined by Hermogenes, the Master of the Offices, who, in some degree, shared his authority, but whose chief object in advancing to the frontier was, if possible, to conclude a peace. The negotiations were resumed, and their lingering progress left Belisarius inactive during many months, without having either to undertake or to repel any military enterprise. It was hoped that the old age of Kobad might incline him to tranquility, and his ambition be satisfied with the conquest of Iberia. But in the midst of these parleys, news suddenly reached the Roman general that an army of forty thousand men was marching against him. These troops comprised the phalanx of ten thousand immortals, the flower of the Persian army, and were commanded by Firouz, who held the office of Mirranes or generalissimo in that country. His confidence of victory was founded as much on his superiority of numbers as on the recent experience of Roman degeneracy, and he announced his approach by the arrogant message that a bath should be ready next evening for his refreshment at Dara. Belisarius only replied by his preparations for battle. In front of the city, towards the side of Nisibis, he had drawn a deep trench, turning inwards at the sides, and then again extended in lines parallel to the first, nor was it devoid of intervals or bridges at regular distances to afford a passage for the Byzantine soldiers. Behind these lines the troops were marshalled in order, the cavalry at the wings, and the infantry under the personal command of Belisarius, in the centre. It was not long before the Persian army appeared upon the plain, but the Mirranes viewing the advantageous position of the Romans deferred his attack till the ensuing day. Meanwhile, the two armies were amused by the aspect, and interested by the augury of a single combat, which was challenged by the Persian, but gained by the Roman champion.
Next morning, the Persians drew a reinforcement of ten thousand men from the garrison of Nisibis, thus increasing their army to double the number of the Roman. Belisarius, doubtful of victory, determined, if possible, to avoid an engagement. He dispatched a letter to the Mirranes, complaining of his aggression at a time when negotiations were in progress, and when hopes of peace might be reasonably entertained. In his answer, Firouz, according to the common practice to excuse by imputing perfidy, complained that no reliance could be placed on the professions or even the oath of a Greek. Thus disappointed, Belisarius commanded that the letters which had passed between them should be affixed to the standards and borne in the brunt of battle, as appeals to Heaven, and testimonies of his own pure and peaceful intentions. A similar measure was once resorted to by the Huns of Sogdiana, and by the Turks on the field of Warna, and it seems well fitted to cheer the soldiers by the expectation of divine support. Nor did Belisarius fail, as was customary in this age, to address his troops i n public; he exhorted them not merely to obtain a present victory, but so effectually to humble the presumption of the Persians that they never again might venture to invade the Roman territories. The Mirranes had delayed his attack till noon, in hopes of finding the Byzantine army, with whose usual hour for meals he was acquainted, faint and exhausted from hunger. He stationed the immortals in his rear as a reserve, and determined to engage with only half the remainder at a time, so that his squadrons might relieve each other by rotation. The battle began by a mutual discharge of arrows, so numerous, says Procopius, as to darken the air. In this distant warfare the Persians were greatly assisted by the constant succession and exchange of reinforcements, which was in some degree counterbalanced by the disadvantage of the wind blowing towards them and diminishing the speed and effect of their
missiles. When the quivers were emptied, the two armies came to closer combat, and the encounter was long and obstinate. At length the left wing of the imperial forces began to yield, and the Persians were already commencing a pursuit, when some Herulian horse, under Pharas, judiciously stationed by Belisarius behind a hill, rushed forward with so unexpected and vigorous a charge as to turn the tide of victory against the barbarians. It was in vain that the Mirranes dispatched to their succor the whole battalion of Immortals. After a valiant resistance they also became involved in the rout, and the victory of the Romans was complete. Throwing aside their weighty bucklers the vanquished fled in every quarter, but left the royal standard in the hands of the Romans, and eight thousand men dead upon the field. Their loss would probably have been more considerable had not their flight been undisturbed from the prudent apprehension of Belisarius lest the tumultuous disorder of his troops in pursuit should encourage and enable the enemy to rally. This victory, the first gained over the Persians by the imperial armies for a long succession of years, produced a great moral effect, and decided the fate of the campaign. The Persians did not dare to encounter the Romans in any pitched engagement, and in the slight skirmishes which sometimes took place the latter maintained their new and unwonted superiority.